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terms within the operation of the Habitual Criminal Statute through the exercise
of judicial discretion as outlined above, the function of that statute would be fairly
carried out and its effectiveness enhanced.
Robert H. Connett
EMINENT DOMAIN: LmBianTy FOR ASSESSMENTS ACCRUING DuRiNG
PROCEEDINGS
Where property has been physically appropriated for public use by the state,
is the owner of the legal title liable for taxes and special assessments that accrue
against the land subsequent to such appropriation but prior to the passage of title
to the condemner?
In the normal situation, the condemner does not enter upon the land until such
time as compensation has been paid to the condemnee. In such cases, the general
rule is that title to the condemned property does not vest in the condemner until
the final judgment in the eminent domain proceedings is paid.1 This rule protects
the owner by preventing the taking of his property without just compensation. 2 It
also protects the condemner because, until the time that the judgment is rendered,
the condemning party may elect to abandon the proceedings and pay only the
court costs and the condemnee's attorney fees.3 As the condemnee is still the legal
owner until the termination of the proceedings, he is obliged to pay the property
taxes and special assessments for local improvements that are levied upon his
land.4 If he fails to pay, the assessing authority may take what is due from the
award granted to the condemnee in the eminent domain proceedings. 5
The rule is different, however, where the condemning party has entered upon
the land under court order and deprived the condemnee of all beneficial use of the
property.6 In this situation, the subsequent divestiture of title is merely a confir-
mation of the original physical taking,7 and all courts that have faced this prob-
lem have recognized the injustice of assessing the condemnee for benefits which he
cannot enjoy.8 Relief is usually granted either on the theory that the transfer of
ownership relates back to the commencement of the proceedings,9 or, as is done in
New York, the sum of the taxes and assessments paid by the condemnee is added
to the compensation subsequently awarded to him.10 Other courts, citing these
cases as authority, reach the same result but give no independent reason for grant-
ing such relief to the condemnee.'1 Both of the principal theories for granting relief
1 CA. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1253.
2 CALIF. CONsT. art I, § 14.
3 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1255a.
4 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain § 200 (1941) ; 18 Au. Jim., Eminent Domain § 235 (1938).
rCAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1252.1.
6 29 CJ.S.,.Eminent Domain § 135 (1941) ; 18 Am..JuR., Eminent Domain § 278 (1938).
7 People v. Joerger, 12 Cal. App. 2d 665, 55 P.2d 1269, 1272 (1936).
8 45 A.L.R.2d 518 (1956).
9 Chicago Park District v. Downey Coal Company, 1 IJ1.2d 54, 111 N.E.2d 223 (1953);
City of Chicago v. McCausland, 379 Ill. 602, 41 N.E.2d 745 (1942); Sherwin v. Wigglesworth,
129 Mass. 64 (1880); Independent Consolidated School District No. 27 v. Waldron, 241 Minn.
326, 63 N.W.2d 555 (1954) ; Jasper Land and Improvement Company v. Kansas City, 293 Mo.
674, 239 S.W. 864 (1922) ; State v. Floyd, 204 N.C. 291, 168 S.E. 222 (1933).0 In re Mayor, 40 App. Div. 281, 58 N.Y.S. 58 (1899).
11 Fishel v. City and County of Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 108 P.2d 236 (1940); Milmar
Estate Inc. v. Borough of Fort Lee, 36 N.J.S. 321, 116 A.2d 592 (1955).
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are subject to criticism. The idea of relation back is nothing more than a legal fic-
tion invented for the sake of convenience. It does not take into account the exact
time when the owner was deprived of the beneficial use of his property which may
be after the taxes become due. The weakness of the second theory lies in cases
where the state is the condemning party, for to include payment of taxes and as-
sessments in the compensation fund will subject the state to taxation indirectly
where it cannot be directly taxed. In California, for instance, the property of the
state is exempt from local taxation and assessment,12 and to compel the state to
pay the condemnee for taxes or assessments he has paid would have the same effect
as levying a direct assessment on the state.
A case in point recently arose for the first time before the California Supreme
Court in People v. Peninsula Title Guaranty Co.13 In that case the condemnees ap-
pealed from a court order directing the payment of $612.20 to the city of San
Mateo to satisfy a claimed assessment lien. The money was to come out of the fund
awarded the condemnees for the condemnation of their property. The assessment
lien was asserted after the state, pursuant to a court order, had taken possession of
the property and started construction of a highway overpass. In its decision re-
versing the trial court, the Supreme Court of California did not rely on either of
the two theories previously discussed, nor did it cite any of the cases which had.
Instead, the court held that a taking which is of sufficient consequence is deemed
to have the same effect of finality of transfer for tax and assessment purposes as
has the passage of title. 14 In seeking to establish what constitutes such a taking,
the court said:
"Where it can be said that in addition to a mere taking of possession by the condemner
there is also such a substantial change in the status of the land taken and the condem-
nee's relation to it as to constitute, in effect, a divestiture for all practical purposes of
the former owners' interest, the strict rule should not apply."'1 5
The strict rule that the court refers to is of course the rule that the condemnee, as
legal owner, is liable for taxes and assessments until the proceedings in eminent
domain are terminated. The test laid down by the court requires two things: a
physical change in the land, and the exclusion of the condemnee. The real prob-
lem is deciding how much of a physical change is necessary in order to bring the
exception to the strict rule into operation. In People v. Peninsula Title Guaranty
Co. the taking consisted of requiring the condemnees to remove themselves from
the property, the removal of buildings by the state, and the construction of a high-
way overpass on the condemnees' land. The court rejected the idea propounded by
the city of San Mateo that the test of the taking must be that the land may not be
restored to its original condition, 16 and cited a case where entry on the land and the
commencement of construction was held to be a sufficient taking.17 People v.
Peninsula Title Guaranty Co. held that the city of San Mateo was not entitled to
collect the assessment lien from the condemnee.
As the law in California now stands, if there appears to be a sufficient taking
of the property the safest thing to do is to advise the condemnee not to pay taxes
12 CAL. CONST. art XIII, § 1; 14 Ops. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 46 (1949).
13 47 Cal. 2d ......... 301 P.2d 1 (1956).
14 Id. at ........,301 P.2d at 4.
15 Id. at ....... ,301 P.2d at 3.
16 Id. at .........301 P.2d at 4.17 Id. at .........301 P.2d at 3.
[Vol. 8
or assessments. Then, under the decision in People v. Peninsula Title Guaranty
Co., the court in the eminent domain proceedings will have to decide whether an
award should be made to the assessing authority from the compensation fund. The
risk that the condemner will abandon the proceedings and leave the condemnee to
pay the taxes or assessments along with interest and penalties seems so slight that
the gamble of waiting is probably well taken.
The solution offered by People v. Peninsula Title Guaranty Co., however,
would be inadequate in a situation where the condemner abandons the proceedings
or where the condemnee pays the taxes or assessments in advance of the final
award. The discussion that follows is an attempt to find a method of dealing fairly
with the parties in these two situations.
In appraising this problem, one is apt to concentrate on the injustice being
done to the condemnee and forget that there are two other interested parties, the
condemner and the assessing authority, each with rights that should be protected.
Although the concept that private property shall not be taken without just com-
pensation should be assigned paramount consideration, we must neither lose sight
of the assessing authority's right to assess property,'8 nor overlook the con-
demner's privilege to abandon the proceedings and its possible immunity from
taxation.
First, consider the effect of abandonment of the proceedings by the condemner.
The condemnee is not only liable for the assessments, but also for penalties that
have resulted from the delinquency. Under the California code provision for aban-
donment,19 he may recover only court costs and attorney's fees from the con-
demner. Where the abandonment has occurred after physical entry on the land,
the condemner has been liable as a trespasser ab initio,20 but there is no reason or
authority for holding a trespasser liable for assessments or taxes, nor for penalties
and interest. Add to this the fact that the condemner may be immune from taxa-
tion, and it is clear that no remedy lies here.
It seems unjust that the condemnee should be held liable for penalties. He may
argue that he was relieved of all burdens during the taking and that, therefore, no
penalties should be assessed against him during the period when the condemna-
tion proceedings were in progress, and that the taxes or assessments did not be-
come delinquent until then. The assessing authority may argue that it has a right
to assess the property, that the condemnee could have paid the assessments and
avoided the penalties but instead took a chance, and that there is no justification
for penalizing the assessing authority for what goes on between the condemner and
the condemnee.
The other situation occurs where the condemnee pays the taxes or assessments
after there has been a substantial taking. Should he be permitted to recover from
the assessing authority upon termination of the eminent domain proceedings?
The only statutory remedy available in California appears to be the following
code section:
Within six months after the payment an action may be brought against a county or a
city in the superior court to recover the taxes paid under protest.21
18 CAL. JuR., Taxation § 23 (1926).
19 See note 3 supra.
2OJohnson v. Climax Molybdenem Co., 109 Colo. 1308, 124 P.2d 929 (1942) ; Mitchell
County v. Hudspeth, 151 Ga. 767, 108 SE. 305 (1921).
21 CAL. R v. AND TAX. CODE § 5138.
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